

Intrinsic Criticism and Deconstruction: Their Methods' Legacy

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Article:

In *After the New Criticism*, Frank Lentricchia claims that American deconstructive criticism is "plainly an ultimate formalism, a New Criticism denied its ontological supports and cultural goals." The view has been hotly contested. Jonathan Culler, for example, has gone so far as to ridicule it openly in his address to the May 1982 IAPL Conference. Unquestionably, at first sight the idea seems absurd that a "cognitive atheist" such as Derrida could be considered remotely similar to critics like Richards and Winters. Nevertheless, I wish to support Lentricchia's claim, although, like Culler, I cannot accept the ontological and epistemological arguments which led to it. To me, the claim makes sense only if the relationship between so-called "intrinsic criticism" and "deconstruction" is grasped in terms of their respective methodologies, rather than in terms of what they imply about the nature of art or truth. The method Derrida employs against Saussure's *Course* and other texts is a logical extension of intrinsic method: it is not a new method that can or should replace the old one, but an extension which, when carried out, necessarily implies ontological and epistemological conclusions which contradict those that presented themselves at the initial stopping place. If in their philosophical implications intrinsic and deconstructive theories remain irreconcilably opposed, methodologically they complement one another.

The peculiar relationship between these two methods helps to explain deconstructive criticism's rapid rise and collapse and why it necessarily brought down intrinsic criticism with it. Although only a brief flash in the history of criticism, it is proving to be of unparalleled importance. But this is the subject for another study. For now I wish merely to examine the essential features of the two methods. To explain deconstructive method, only a brief review of Derrida's own excellent exposition will be necessary; for intrinsic method, however, a radical analysis, starting from E. D. Hirsch's definition, will be required.

An unargued premise underlies this analysis, namely, that there is no *practical* difference between the New Critical thesis that literary works should be considered aesthetic objects and the structuralist/formalist thesis that a text should be considered as a whole, or as part of a whole, and that the "meaning" of a text is determined by the relations of part to part and part to whole. I hold that the vast differences among the material objects of the various theories I mention here are irrelevant from the standpoint of pure methodology, since they do not affect an underlying unity of procedure. This extraordinarily abstract view of modern criticism is necessary to accomplish an appropriate comparison with Derrida's methodology.

Intrinsic Method: A Kantian Tradition

E. D. Hirsch, Jr., in "Some Aims of Criticism,"² claims the following about intrinsic criticism: "The original and powerful programmatic idea—that literature should be dealt with as literature and not some other thing—still remains the dominant though not the only guiding principle for the teaching and criticism of literature" ("SA," 41). In the category of "intrinsic criticism," Hirsch includes the work of men as diverse in style, taste, and terminology as Richards, Leavis, Winters, Wimsatt, Booth, and Frye. According to Hirsch, these critics and others attributed an exclusive ontological status to literature. Commonly, their assumption was that literature,

whatever else it may be, is essentially art, and, therefore, aesthetic criteria should determine interpretive procedures.

Intrinsic criticism drew its aesthetic criteria directly from the Kantian tradition—the tradition, that is, that placed Kant's aesthetics in the camp of what George Dickie has described as "aesthetic attitude" theory. In order to translate aesthetic criteria into interpretive procedures, since at bottom aesthetics is a perceptual theory, intrinsic theory had to consider literary works as literary *objects*—as aesthetic objects. Thus, for the purposes of intrinsic criticism, works became things. Familiar titles—*The Well-Wrought Urn*, *The Verbal Icon*, etc.—are often quite honest in this regard.

Once a critic assumes that a literary work is an object, if he is to be able to discuss the meaning of the work and argue for his interpretation he *must* follow a fixed sequence of procedures that lie logically between the starting point—the assumption that literary works *are* aesthetic objects—and the critic's final goal. That goal was an ideological one: these critics felt that to maintain our culture's high valuation of literature, a connection between its "internal" and "external" traits had to be demonstrable. As Hirsch put it, their common, characteristic goal was to "attempt to overcome the traditional disjunction between the artistic qualities of literature (*dulce*) and its instrumental effects (*utile*)" in order to "explain the common assertion of a pre-established harmony between the external effects of literature and its internal traits . . ." ("SA," 43-44).

Intrinsic criticism, therefore, as diverse as the specific instances of its practice are, requires only a few essential steps. The first step is to agree to see the work as an aesthetic object. This decision is usually motivated by the reader's recognition of certain conventions that he believes will indicate the author's intention to produce an aesthetic object. The assumption of such conventions is not essential to the method, however. Anything may be considered an aesthetic object.

The imposition of the aesthetic attitude upon the text involves a number of effects. First is the reduction of existential meaning. Strictly speaking, the attitude is imposed before the text is read—there is as yet no meaning to reduce from. As we will see shortly, this does not really matter to intrinsic critics in theory, since "extrinsic meaning" will be brought in from the "outside." Second is the assumption of the "text." The text is objectified: the marks on the page or the sounds of the voice materially limit the boundaries of the object. From this point on, whatever meanings the text is allowed to generate (and this varies from theory to theory) must be tied to the text.

A third effect of the aesthetic standpoint leads directly to the second step in the procedure. Viewing the text as a self-contained whole implies that it is made up of parts. The essence of intrinsic method is its attempt to explain the relationships of part to part and part to whole. But a text does not break itself down into parts—the critic must fragment it, segment it, deciding which sounds, words, phrases, sentences, passages, etc., are important, equivalent, repetitious, contrasting, and so on. Thus the crucial thing to decide at this juncture is precisely what the segments should be. Although segmentation is crucial to intrinsic theory, the theory itself does not demand a particular mode of segmentation. It only matters that somehow a sequence of marks on a page becomes translated into a pattern of significant units of sense.

Rhetorical versions of the theory, for example, might break the marks into passages which are assumed to have a speaker, an audience, a subject, a tone, a set of attitudes expressed by the speaker, and so forth. Thus they translate the marks on the page into a sequence in an event of a rhetorical situation.

A number of the earlier European approaches—the Russian Formalist and the Prague schools, for example—took the "thingness" of poetry quite literally. Literary art, by the process of "defamiliarization" (*ostranenie*), frustrated the usual transcendent functions of language. According to Formalist thinking, language in its primary functions points toward conceptions by interrelating conventional signs. Because language is conventional, the possibility of breaking conventions is always present. If a convention is broken, the reader's attention moves from what is usually indicated, a concept, to the language itself, a concrete materiality.

Therefore the segments are marked by deformations of the usual conventional syntax. The problem with these schools is that they took each individual segment to be an aesthetic object. Therefore they remained entirely within the lower levels of a structure and dealt well only with patterns of repetition and so forth.

Later, the French Structuralists accepted the notion of "closure"— meaning that they took the entire text to be a single object. With their work, the text came to be seen as a system of structures, structures within structures. For both the Formalists and the Structuralists, however, the principles which determined the processes of segmentation were derived from linguistics. Grammar, in other words, served as an heuristic for interpretation.

Thus the second step presupposes the importation of an heuristic. By applying the heuristic, the reader simultaneously segments the text and brings each segment into a class or category. The origin of the heuristic is unimportant so long as the concepts of the heuristic themselves belong to a conceptual totality. Ideally, the segmentation is exhaustive, though not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is necessary that no segment be constituted or described by a concept from without the heuristic order. Furthermore, segments and passages of segments must be described by a set of categories extrinsic to the text itself. Otherwise, according to the theory, the reader risks circularity.

The final step, or series of steps, is redescription. Once a pattern or sequence of segments has been established (either methodically or, as in the case of "close readers," unconsciously), the critic can introduce a set of more general categories—and then introduce more general categories on top of the former. At this "higher" level, the work of literature can become obviously connected to the "outside," becoming an example for psychoanalytic theories, mythic theories, semiotic theories, or what-not. The sequence "mode," "symbol," "myth"—familiar to us in Frye's criticism—is an example of this possibility. In Hirsch's terms, the emphasis would shift from *meaning to significance*; but there really is no clear demarcation between the two. For each theory, the rules of redescription are different. Some require the reader to use his "non-literary" experience or his other "literary" experience; some require that he avoid using one or the other, or both. Directly related to this, each theory handles the problem of plurivocity differently. The amount of ambiguity connotation, irony, and so forth depends primarily on the complexity of the initial heuristic order and on the talent and experience of the individual critic, but it also depends on the redescription rules of each theory.

The redescription rules depend logically on the nature of the segmentation process, but the actual rules are usually illogically related to the process. For example, genres and conventional genre indicators are often used as the primary means of reducing plurivocity *and* as segmenting principles along with an independent hierarchical heuristic order, even when there is no logical relationship between the genres and the heuristic. The better theories resolve the problem in one of two ways: either by rejecting genre altogether, as did Schlegel and Croce, or by fully integrating the genres with the heuristic, as did Frye and Hirsch.

All intrinsic criticisms require these three steps: (1) the establishment of a text as an aesthetic object, (2) the segmentation of the text through the application of an independent heuristic order, and (3) the redescription of the text by subsuming the segments into a series of more general, more integrally related categories.

Intrinsic criticisms differ from one another primarily according to their assumption of the material ground of the formal aesthetic object, by their selection of the independent heuristic order, and by their segmentation of the text. Of these, the most crucial to evaluating a particular theory is segmentation. It should be obvious that the initial selection of the segments determines immediately what can be considered critical to interpretations by its limiting in advance the possible hierarchical orderings. The initial segmentation also restricts the possibilities of validation. Obviously no two interpretations will agree if they segment the text differently. For these reasons, intrinsic criticism must acknowledge a plurality of equally valid yet mutually conflicting interpretations and therefore a plurality of criticisms.

Intrinsic theory cannot avoid critical pluralism, for only one principle endemic to intrinsic theory guides segmentation: the segmentation must not be arbitrary; it must be guided by the heuristic. If the text is segmented

arbitrarily, the interpretation violates the principle of closure; that is, the text is no longer regarded as a unified whole—an aesthetic object. At that point intrinsic criticism becomes something else.

Thus, the transition from structuralism to "post-structuralism" began precisely when Roland Barthes recognized that criticisms based on structural linguistics had been "reducing language to the sentence and its lexical components"³ and questioned the univocity of the text and the validity of coherent interpretations. He refused to approach the text as if it were a concrete whole. Unless the text is approached "step by step," he said, it will lose its plurivocity. Approached in this way, the text produces no "final effect" on the reader, presents no unified vision, has no dominant theme: " ...everything signifies ceaselessly and several times, but without being delegated to a great final ensemble, to an ultimate structure" (*S/Z*, 12). In order to describe the text, therefore, he arbitrarily segments it "into a series of brief, contiguous fragments" (*S/Z*, 19), which he called *lexias*. Barthes has an heuristic—"five major codes under which all the textual signifiers can be grouped" (*S/Z*, 19)—but the segmentation proceeds without reference to the heuristic categories. In addition, Barthes refuses to integrate his five codes: " ...if we make no effort to structure each code, or the five codes among themselves, we do so deliberately, in order to assume the multivalence of the text, its partial reversibility" (*S/Z*, 20).

To Barthes, the presumption that individual readings should be coherent but that any number of conflicting readings could be valid made no sense. From his point of view, admitting that every reading experience is actually incoherent and arbitrary is more honest. Whether we accept Barthes's judgment or not, we must at least acknowledge that his work discovered one of the boundaries of intrinsic theory.

Another, more limiting boundary—again related to the segmentation process—is, as Hirsch puts it, the "tendency of interpretations to be self-contained and incommensurable ... "⁴ Since there is no *a priori* correspondence between the heuristic order and the text it is to describe, the initial segmentation must proceed by a series of guesses. Hirsch calls these "interpretive hypotheses." Intrinsic theory holds that the hypothesis is confirmed if the entire text will fall into line under a hierarchical structure on the basis of the initial hypothesis. But, as Hirsch points out, "Every interpreter labors under the handicap of an inevitable circularity: all his internal evidence tends to support his hypothesis because much of it was constituted by his hypothesis" (*VI*, 166). Thus all interpretations tend to be self-confirming. At the same time, "when a text is construed under different generic conceptions, some of the data generated by one conception will be different from those generated by the others" (*VI*, 167). In effect, pluralism results not only when criticisms use different heuristics, but also when two interpretations use the same heuristic if they begin with different yet equally acceptable initial hypotheses.

Finally, intrinsic criticism is bounded by historicity, which it does not attempt to breach. It takes no account, of itself, of change. It is the critique of the present moment, freezing the motion of language into figures on the urn. In its initial step, it takes the literary experience as a single unity, rounds off its rough edges into the unity of a significant whole, gives it a meaning. This is its great power: intrinsic criticism brings order to its objects—not only to individual works, but to entire traditions. The changes it marks are of difference, of the comparison of unit to unit, and it orders units as it orders relations within units.

Historicity limits intrinsic criticism not because the theory abstracts from temporality, but because it has no way of dealing with it. Temporality is *not a problem* for intrinsic theory—the theory simply assumes the historicity of the text. Sigurd Burckhardt, in his "Notes on the Theory of Intrinsic Interpretation,"⁵ gives the theory's most blatantly naive answer to the objection of historicity, and for that it is the most revealing. To Burckhardt, so long as one knows the language in which a text is written, and so long as one knows the relevant *topoi* of the time, one can "gloss" the text: "And, indeed, for many poems glossing is quite sufficient; they do not need an interpretation, for (given an understanding of their vocabulary) they are easy to grasp" (*SM*, 299). Interpretation is necessary only when something "disturbs" the reader: "I begin to interpret when I tell myself that the 'disturbing element' arises from a discrepancy between my conception and *the poem itself*; it begins when I recognize that this conception is an initial and possibly subconscious hypothesis, which must be revised in accordance with the text of the poem" (*SM*, 302). I recognize that Burckhardt's exposition is overly simplistic

and that it is unfair to equate it with more sophisticated versions of intrinsic theory; still, it points toward the most important generalization we can make about intrinsic theory: it does not attempt to *understand* texts, not in the sense meant in modern hermeneutics. Intrinsic theory resolves conflicting understandings. It is a method of arbitration.

A great weakness of American deconstructive theory is that it does not acknowledge arbitration as intrinsic method's function. This is forgivable since the proponents of the method have seldom acknowledged it themselves. Formalists have implied, if not explicitly stated, that form is essential—and that the form revealed by *their* method is essential. This latter conclusion is what deconstruction shows to be spurious.

Deconstructive Method

Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project first came to the attention of the American scholarly community through his essay "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences."⁶ There he simply and rather elliptically laid out the formal characteristics of structure itself, setting the stage for a critique of structuralist thought, which to his mind was in fact a critique of the mainstream of Western thought. His argument ran like this: For there to be an ordered interrelation of elements within a structure or system, the system must achieve total form through the stability of a "center." The "structurality of structure," accordingly, "has always been neutralized or reduced . . . by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin" (WD, 278). The origin or center is assumed to escape structurality; that is, it must not depend upon its place in the system to be what it is. The center is thus "contradictorily coherent": "The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its presence elsewhere" (WD, 279). In other words, the center must be outside the field of *play* of the structure; the displacements, substitutions, and transformations which govern the elements of the structure must refer to the center and yet not affect it.

Derrida's claim is simply that structure is always structural. That is, every structure has many possible centers, which is the same as saying no structure is, in itself, centered. He therefore seeks events of decentering thought, when structuralism seeks to explain itself only to find that its centers can be understood only in terms of more structures. Deconstruction is a method designed specifically to produce such events. It is *not* an interpretive method; rather, it is a method of demonstrating that "intrinsic interpretations" contain within themselves further possibilities, including their own contradiction.

Derrida most clearly explains his method, the general strategy of deconstruction, in two places. "The Exorbitant. Question of Method," a section in *Of Grammatology*,⁷ makes clear the motives behind the strategy. "Positions,"⁸ an interview with the editors of *Promesse*, spells out the details of the procedure. There are other forms of deconstruction, but this is the basic method.

In Derrida's terminology, interpretive strategies which attempt to appropriate texts by recasting their meaning through an heuristic are "doubling commentaries." Deconstruction is a "redoubling," a turning of a structural interpretation upon itself. As a redoubling, in its initial stages deconstruction does not challenge intrinsic theory's presupposition that the text's historicity is unproblematic. Accordingly, deconstruction "does not consist of reproducing . . . the conscious, voluntary, intentional relationship that the writer institutes in his exchanges with the history to which he belongs thanks to the element of language" (OG, 159). To put to rest any doubts, he says, "This method has occasionally been opposed to the traditional doubling commentary; it could be shown that it actually comes to terms with it quite easily" (OG, 159). This last is an understatement. Only through an initial intrinsic reading can deconstruction reach its aim.

So in order to undermine intrinsic interpretation, Derrida says, "We must begin *wherever we are*" (historically) within an intrinsic reading of the text (whether of an external "reality" or of a "book"). Sometimes he works from within someone else's interpretation;⁹ sometimes he supplies his own. The object of his game is to take seriously the split between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. These two can always be represented as a set of polar oppositions: good, evil; authenticity, inauthenticity; form, content; signifier, signified, etc. By his definition of

structure, any systematic, "metaphysical" structure will have such an opposition at its center. To show that "in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a *vis-à-vis*, but with a violent hierarchy" ("P," 36), Derrida reasons that if the hierarchical opposition is not governed by a transcendental referent, a simple inversion of the hierarchy will prevent any neutralization leading to an antithesis. Here deconstruction differs most radically from Hegelian sublimation. Deconstruction prohibits textual unity: it does not expose disunity in order to achieve a greater totality.

And here we find the ultimate goal of deconstruction. Whereas intrinsic theory specifically sought to promote "a pre-established harmony between the external effects of literature and its internal traits" ("SA," 43-44), deconstruction seeks its disunity. Similarly, deconstruction's starting point reverses intrinsic theory's. The Kantian aesthetics that guided, for example, T. E. Hulme's notion of the word-image¹⁰—a notion that found its most powerful influence in the essays of Pound and Eliot—assumes an *a priori* fusion between sense and sensation. For deconstruction, the thesis of linguistic closure dictates that such a fusion must be demonstrated, if it can be, and not merely be assumed. Therefore deconstruction focuses on those "centers" of structure which are left untouched by structural analysis because they are supposedly grounded in experience.

The first step of deconstruction, then, is to invert the hierarchy. But, at this stage, "the hierarchy of the dual opposition always reconstitutes itself" ("P," 36) unless Derrida can, as his second step, "mark the gap" of difference between the first and second hierarchy ("P," 36). A difficult problem arises here because it is in principle "impossible to take bearings" ("P," 36) from the inside once it has become the outside.

For example, in his deconstruction of Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*, Derrida focuses on Saussure's exclusion of writing from the domain of language. Saussure claimed that writing was derivative, and he presupposes, Derrida says, "a natural bond of sense to the senses" (*OG*, 34): "The only true bond, the bond of sound" (*OG*, 35).¹¹ By this exclusion, Saussure believed, he had assured that the integrity of the thought-sound—the ideal sign as value—would be subject to immediate intuition. Therefore, when Derrida inverted the hierarchy between speech and writing, he had to substitute the "instituted trace" for the phoneme, since the former could not possibly claim the proximity to consciousness Saussure attributed to the latter. Nevertheless, it could perform the same function within the system: logic does not prevent it from doing so. Still, having no content, the trace cannot be considered a concept; it becomes a mere "mark" which notes the difference between the original hierarchy and its inversion:

Henceforth, in order to mark this gap more clearly ... it was necessary to analyze, to put to work ... certain marks, shall we say ... which I call *by analogy* (I emphasize this) undecidables, i.e., simulative units, "false" verbal, nominal or semantic properties, which escape from inclusion in the philosophical (binary) oppositions and which nonetheless inhabit it, resist and disorganize it, but *without ever* constituting a third term, without ever occasioning a solution in the form of speculative dialectics. ("P," 36)

By "marking the gap" Derrida shows that he does not merely want to criticize a particular interpretation by correcting the selection of the hierarchy, substituting another for it. He wants to show that the entire structural edifice is built upon air, that the ungrounded mark is in fact the center, and that it will not hold.

In the third stage, then, Derrida rewrites the entire schema on the basis of the mark. At a certain point in the process, he reaches what we might call the central metaphor. Derrida calls it "a nervure, a fold, an angle which interrupts totalization" ("P," 37). At this point, "no series of semantic valences can any longer be brought to a close or gathered all together" ("P," 37), as they were in the original interpretation. The interpretation has the same structure as the original, but written now "under erasure" on the grounds of a "concept" that we know is only a groundless mark. We cannot claim, then, that at this point the text "opens onto an inexhaustible richness of meaning or onto the transcendence of a semantic excess" ("P," 37). It is an ungrounded ambiguity plain and simple.

The Legacy

In effect, Derrida's three-step deconstruction undermines the authority of whatever heuristic may have guided an intrinsic interpretation's structuring process. The numerous deconstructions enacted by Derrida and his followers demonstrate that no matter how we close off phenomena, no matter what structural models we impose upon them, no matter what point of view we take, and no matter how large or small the context we assume, so long as we accept the basic formalist assumptions I outlined earlier, our resulting interpretations of these phenomena will be the product of the structuring process itself and therefore cannot claim the privilege of being guided by the phenomena.

Thus the very possibility of applying deconstructive method serves as the basis for the philosophical claims its practitioners have made about the production of difference, the plurivocity of signifiers, the illusion of representation, the radical historicity of experience, and so forth. For students of literature, these claims end in the conclusion that no text is subject to a definitive, univocal interpretation. Or as Harold Bloom would put it, every reading is necessarily a misreading.

Is this all that deconstruction, in the long run, can tell us—that every text has many possible meanings? Only a few intrinsic critics ever claimed more. Arbitrating possible meanings, intrinsic method produces coherent interpretations. Deconstruction dispells the illusion that readings produced from a fixed standpoint have more than a transitory coherence. And now, from the distance of the ten years since Derrida read "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" at Johns Hopkins, creating the wave that would eventually capsize New Criticism, we are tempted to assert that radical plurivocity is all that the structuralist controversy has left floating. Does deconstruction destroy intrinsic interpretation and, since the former depends upon the latter for its starting point, destroy itself?

In 1977, J. Hillis Miller asserted that intrinsic readings and deconstructionist readings really share a kind of symbiotic relationship, that each needs the other in a strange bond "of intimate kinship and at the same time of enmity" not "open to a dialectical synthesis."¹² This may indeed be true. I have already discussed how deconstruction presupposes intrinsic reading; and if we consider deconstruction as a way of inventing possible readings—as a kind of pre-heuristic procedure—it may very well be that intrinsic interpretation has always presupposed deconstruction as well. For example, it is easy to conceive the process of revising an initial hypothesis, mentioned but never described by critics such as Burckhardt and Hirsch, as a deconstructive process. If it were the case that all the meaning produced by an intrinsic interpretation or its reversal were generated by the methods themselves, then we would have to conclude that the two methods mutually destroy themselves. Like a "perpetual motion machine," once the force of an initiating will plays out, interpretation grinds to a stop.

The parallel analyses I have presented here suggest, however, that of all the processes involved in the structuring/destructuring procedures of contemporary criticism one seems to be especially significant: the process of segmentation. The reader's determination of emphasis, punctuation, or what Derrida called "interval in general"—the unsaid, the unwritten, the implied and perhaps lost background against which signs can make sense—seems to fall outside the scope of formalist methodology. Certainly, theories have tried to control or neutralize the effects of this process. In classic intrinsic interpretation, passages may be established by an heuristic; in late structuralism, they are established arbitrarily; and in deconstruction, although initially using the "obvious" segmentation or borrowing from some heuristically established set of passages, the deconstructionist must assume that "no passage has any particular priority over the others."¹³

Yet the segmentation process is not necessarily determined by formalist methods simply because it is not contained by the rules of language—it is not itself formal. We have always known that in oral presentations, two readers of the same text can convey quite different readings of that text simply by varying inflection, voice tone, emphasis, and so forth. Now we are considerably more aware that culture, ideology, and psychological and physical differences of all sorts affect the way people who share the same language read. More importantly, we are now concerned less about the mere fact that these differences exist than about how they come to be.

Reader response, reception, situation theories and others now recognize that segmentation is the core of the problem of interpretation. And this is the legacy of the structuralist controversy.

NOTES

1 *After the New Criticism* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 169.

2 Some Aims of Criticism," in *Literary Theory and Structure: Essays in Honor of William B. Wimsatt*, ed. Brank Brady, John Palmer, and Martin Price (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 41-62. Hereafter cited as "SA."

3 Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 7. Subsequent references will occur parenthetically in the text.

4 *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), p. 167. Hereafter cited as

5 *Shakespearean Meanings* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968). The "Notes" is an appendix to the main text, pp. 285-313. Hereafter cited as SM.

6 The paper was first given in America in a symposium, "The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man," at Johns Hopkins. It was first published in *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 247-72. All references here, however, are to Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 278-93. Hereafter cited as WD.

7 *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974). Hereafter cited as OG.

8 "Positions," *Diacritics*, 2, no. 4 (1972), 35-43. Hereafter cited as "P."

9 His deconstruction of Rousseau in *Of Grammatology*, for example, borrows heavily from Jean Starobinski's *L'oeil vivant* (Paris, 1961).

10 See T. E. Hulme, *Speculations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1924), pp. 134-35.

11 See Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 25.

12 "Stevens'Rock' and Criticism as Cure, II," *Georgia Review*, 30 (1976), 334.

13 J. Hillis Miller, "Fiction and Repetition: *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*," in *Forms of Modern British Fiction*, ed. Allan Warren Friedman (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1975), p. 58.